I shall begin by explaining the positions of Popper and Kuhn in greater depth.
Popper on Criticism
From the beginning of his career, Popper pushed the idea that a critical attitude is at the heart of the scientific persona, and that a critical method is its proper counterpart.
Despite his well-known emphasis on the importance of falsifiability, he acknowledged in the original version of The Logic of Scientific Discovery (i.e. in 1934 but only translated into English in 1959) that:
A system such as classical mechanics may be 'scientific' to any degree you like; but those who uphold it dogmatically -believing, perhaps, that it is their business to defend such a successful system against criticism as long as it is not conclusively disproved -are adopting the very reverse of that critical attitude which in my view is the proper one for the scientist. (Popper 1959, p.50) Just a little later, in an article in Mind, he declared:
1 Forgive me if this sounds immodest. My view may simply be a result of the gulf between the philosophy of science and science studies. No doubt the reader can reach a judgement as to the relative accuracy and depth of our respective treatments.
[I]t is the most characteristic feature of the scientific method that scientists will do everything they can in order to criticize and test the theory in question.
Criticizing and testing go hand in hand: the theory is criticized from very many different standpoints in order to bring out those points which may be vulnerable... (Popper 1940, p.404) And throughout the rest of his career, at least until Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge appeared, Popper adhered to this line. In The Open Society and its Enemies, he wrote: ' [R] ationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience.' (Popper 1945, vol. II, p.249) . In the preface to the first English edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he wrote: 'I equate the rational attitude and the critical attitude. The point is that, whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it.' (Popper 1959, p.16) . Sure enough, the message is the same in
Conjectures and
Refutations: 'The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality.' (Popper 1963, p.67) And even in more obscure places, e.g. in Popper's response to a critique of his views on demarcation by his ex-student W. W. Bartley, we find passages such as the following:
[W]hat characterizes the scientific approach is a highly critical attitude towards our theories rather than a formal criterion of refutability: only in the light of such a critical attitude and the corresponding critical methodological approach do 'refutable' theories retain their refutability. (Popper 1968, p.94) The point behind all this textual evidence is not to belabour the point that Popper was pro-criticism. Rather it is supposed to throw the following passage, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, into sharp relief:
I believe that science is essentially critical... But I have always stressed the need for some dogmatism: the dogmatic scientist has an important role to play.
If we give in to criticism too easily, we shall never find out where the real power of our theories lies. (Popper 1970, p. 55) What happened? Only at two other points before 1970, in Popper's published works, did he suggest that there is a need for dogmatism in science. One key passage is as follows:
[D]ogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by way of approximations: if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we were very nearly right. (Popper 1963, p.64) 2 However, the extent to which dogmatism is useful, according to this view, is only in so far as we are fallible. That is to say, dogmatism will only prove useful on those occasions where we are 'very nearly right' despite evidence to the contrary. But how about when we are wrong? And furthermore, might we not accept a methodological 2 This passage is from a chapter based on a lecture delivered in 1953, but I do not know if it appeared in the original. (The other place is a footnote in Popper's revised version of 'What is Dialectic?', again in Conjectures and Refutations. In the original paper in Mind -Popper 1940 -the relevant footnote did not appear.) It would be interesting to see if this is an addition made after 1961, when Kuhn presented his paper on the function of dogma in Oxford (later published as Kuhn 1963) . Gattei (2008, p.40) notes that Lakatos attended Kuhn's talk, and also that it caused somewhat of a stir. It is therefore safe to assume that Popper knew about it. rule such as 'Do not accept that a theory is falsified too easily' without being dogmatic at all? We will return to these questions when we have looked at what Kuhn had to say about dogmatism.
Kuhn on Dogmatism
In contradistinction to Popper, Kuhn suggested that adherence to the status quo was characteristic of actual 'normal', and derivatively good, science.
3 Infamously, Kuhn (1996, p. 80) claimed that an experiment which backfires is normally taken, and should normally be taken, to reflect badly on the scientist that performs it: 'Failure to achieve a solution discredits only the scientist and not the theory … "It is a poor carpenter who blames his tools"...'
Moreover, Kuhn (ibid., p. 80) suggested that normal science can enable us 'to solve a puzzle for whose very existence the validity of the paradigm must be assumed'. So in short, he thought that work within a paradigm (qua disciplinary matrix) is possible only if that paradigm is taken for granted. Later in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he expressed this view at greater length:
[T]rial attempts [to solve puzzles], whether by the chess player or by the scientist, are trials only of themselves, not of the rules of the game. They are possible only so long as the paradigm itself is taken for granted. (Kuhn 1996, p. 144-145) As I have argued elsewhere (Rowbottom 2006 and Rowbottom Forthcoming A) This claim may also be somewhat dubious, however, because it is possible to do things for extrinsic reasons. I could learn to recite a poem in order to impress a prospective lover without having any interest in verse or metre, just as a scientist could be content to solve puzzles, in the short term, in order to support himself and slowly build a reputation which would lead to some of his potentially revolutionary ideas being taken more seriously by his peers.
Nevertheless, Kuhn had a valid point to the extent that he was worried about scientists becoming hypercritical: 'The scientist who pauses to examine every anomaly he notes will seldom get significant work done.' (Kuhn 1996, p.82 
Kuhn vs. Popper in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
The stage has now been set for an examination of the exchange between Popper and
Kuhn in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. We have seen that the former emphasised the importance of criticism and non-conformity in science, whereas the latter thought that conformity and focused puzzle-solving are essential (at least in 'normal science'). It is therefore clear that they were set for a collision course when they were brought together, as Gattei (2008, ch.2) illustrates. He adds: 'Fundamental here are the contrasting words "criticism" and "dogma", chosen in order to emphasize the differences and characterize the two opposing positions -two diametrically opposed positions. ' Gattei (2008, p.54) given a theory which permits normal science... scientists need not engage the puzzles it supplies. They could instead behave as practitioners of the protosciences must; they could, that is, seek potential weak spots, of which there are always large numbers, and endeavour to erect alternate theories around them.
Most of my present critics believe they should do so. I disagree but exclusively on strategic grounds... (Kuhn 1970b, p. 243 & p. 246) But what are the strategic grounds upon which Kuhn made his recommendation? His fundamental idea was that only by working positively with our current theories for a considerable period -trying to refine them, improve and increase their applicability, and so forth 6 -can we discover their true strengths and weaknesses. And then if we do decide that change is needed, we will know where to focus our attention:
Because that exploration will ultimately isolate severe trouble spots, they [i.e.
normal scientists] can be confident that the pursuit of normal science will inform them when and where they can most usefully become Popperian critics. (Ibid., p. 247)
One problem with Kuhn's suggestion is that he leaves it so vague. It is not clear, for instance, what counts as a severe trouble spot (and who should get to decide).
Furthermore, it is unclear how long we should stick with a theory in the face of trouble spots. And finally, crucially, it is unclear why working with a theory for a long time should improve the chance of isolating genuine limitations of the theory. This is clearer when we consider Kuhn's proposed strategy in the light of Duhem's (1954, pp. 183-90) thesis -that 'an experiment … can never condemn an isolated hypothesis but only a whole theoretical group… [so] a "crucial experiment" is impossible'.
In short, the salient question is "When should one challenge the theory itself, rather than the auxiliary assumptions used in order to derive predictions from it?" Kuhn seems to have suggested that the auxiliaries do (and should) always give way in 'normal science'. 7 Naturally this is completely at odds with Popper's (1959, p. 83) dictum that: 'As regards auxiliary hypotheses… only those are acceptable whose introduction does not diminish the degree of falsifiability or testability of the system in question.'
Clearly it would be foolish to recommend that we should always consider theories falsified when predictions derived from them, in combination with auxiliary hypotheses, are inconsistent with observations. So Kuhn's recommended strategy is certainly an improvement on naive falsificationism (which was never actually endorsed by Popper).
But let us now reconsider the passage highlighted in the earlier discussion of Popper's views on criticism:
[T]he dogmatic scientist has an important role to play. If we give in to criticism too easily, we shall never find out where the real power of our theories lies. (Popper 1970, p. 55) We can now see that Popper might instead have said that we should be willing to criticise auxiliary hypotheses as well as theories, and that we shouldn't be too quick to condemn the latter rather than the former. Writing of a similar earlier passage and anticipating some of this paper's later findings, Musgrave (1974, pp. 580-581) also notes that Popper's comments on dogmatism: '... might seem to conflict with his more frequent emphasis on the desirability of a critical attitude. The apparent conflict is heightened by the psychologicist terminology -to resolve it, we must read 'attitude' in a non-psychological way in both places. But then what is of 'considerable significance' is not a dogmatic attitude as such: a dogmatic attitude towards T will only be fruitful if it leads a scientist to improve T, to articulate and elaborate it so that it can deal with counterarguments; it will be unfruitful if it means merely that a scientist sticks to T without improving it.' I will later argue, however, that sometimes a dogmatic attitude may allow a scientist to do things that he otherwise would not.
Popper's comment here is fair, because Kuhn was much more extreme in his claims about the value of shielding theories from criticism. The following two quotations, in particular, illustrate this:
It is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 5) Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have committed them to an older tradition…is not a violation of scientific standards (Kuhn 1996, p. 151) It is not entirely misleading, therefore, to paint Popper and Kuhn as two extremists on the issue of the role of criticism in science. On the one hand, Popper suggested -at many points in his writing, at least -that:
(P) Each and every scientist should have a critical attitude (and follow the same critical procedures).
On the other, Kuhn -or at least a slight caricature of Kuhn 10 -suggested that:
(K) Each and every scientist should puzzle solve within the boundaries of the disciplinary matrix, on the basis of the exemplars therein, until almost every scientist comes to see particular failures as indicating serious anomalies.
11 10 I would defend the view that this is a fair interpretation of Kuhn's view in the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Several commentators on this paper have suggested it is a caricature of his later position; I disagree to the extent that I think he maintained that non-puzzle-solving functions are required only in extraordinary science.
I should emphasise that (K) only goes for 'normal science', and that 'puzzle solving' involves many different forms of activity (as shown later in figure 5 ). It is crucial to the plausibility of Kuhn's view that 'rational' disagreement between scientists (Kuhn 1977, p.332 ) is permissible during periods of extraordinary science.
It appears to follow that it is necessary (and not merely sufficient) for the best possible science for each and every scientist to either (on P) be maximally critical, or (on K) be an expert puzzle solver (and/or to let critical activity have a narrow and well-defined scope for most of the time). So each and every scientist is expected to perform the same functions, qua scientist, on either view. 12 Failure to do so will lead to something less than ideal science.
In what follows, I shall challenge this notion that all scientists should adopt similar stances, and suggest that the best possible science may be realizable in more than one way. I will also suggest that there is a place for dogmatism in something close to
Kuhn's sense when we look at matters at the group level, but also that critical procedures are crucial. The key idea, as Kitcher (1990, p. 6 ) puts it, is that there is 'a mismatch between the demands of individual rationality and those of collective (or community) rationality'.
13
11 Of course the proper mechanism by which scientists should come to see particular failures as indicating serious anomalies is never satisfactorily explained in Kuhn's work. And furthermore, it appears that one scientist or another will have to start a chain reaction by questioning the boundaries of the disciplinary matrix. But for present purposes, let us put this to one side. 12 This may be slightly unfair to Kuhn, because puzzle-solving involves a variety of activities. But Kuhn nowhere explained why some scientists might engage in one type of puzzle-solving, and others engage in another. Furthermore, he did not endeavour to say how (or even if) a balance ought to be struck. For more on this issue, see footnote 20 and the discussion of stances and paradigms in Rowbottom Forthcoming A. 13 Why did Kuhn and Popper not consider this possibility? It is perhaps easier to say for the latter, given his methodological individualism and the focus on proper scientific method for the individual of
A Functional Analysis
The differences between Kuhn and Popper can be neatly understood by thinking in terms of functions, as I will show below. Moreover, thinking in this way suggests a means by which to resolve their debate; namely to consider functions at the group, rather than the individual, level. Popper (1975) noted 'that should individual scientists ever become "objective and rational" in the sense of "impartial and detached", then we should indeed find the revolutionary progress of science barred by an impenetrable obstacle'.) The former, on the other hand, was clearly in the correct intellectual territory to think about research groups in terms of inputs, outputs, and functions (or processes). Tentatively, I would suggest that his failure to move to a view of group rationality as distinct from individual rationality was as a result of what he saw in the history of science, from which he derived his normative conclusions, and what Watkins (1970, p. 34 ) calls his 'Paradigm-Monopoly thesis' that a 'scientist cannot, while under the sway of one paradigm, seriously entertain a rival paradigm'. Ultimately, Kuhn thought that sharp discontinuities (at the group level) are necessary for good science; but allowing for individual scientists to (rationally) do highly different things is to render such discontinuities unnecessary. Thus, Kuhn failed to entertain the notion that group functions and individual functions might come apart.
The simple Popperian scientist fulfils two functions (which fall inside the grey area in Fig. 1 ): one imaginative, and the other critical. 14 In short, the scientist uses propositions from outside sources (e.g. tradition and experience) to criticise his hypotheses (which are often derived from his imagination). The critical function may involve several procedures, e.g. non-empirical checks for internal consistency as well as empirical tests. Those hypotheses that survive the process count as corroborated (and are outputs). But simply because a hypothesis is corroborated, this does not mean that it is no longer subject to the critical function (and hence the bidirectional arrow between 'critical' and 'corroborated hypotheses').
There is, however, one rather striking feature of the Popperian scientist so depicted;
he is purely theoretical in orientation. This appears to be the correct view of Popper's position because he suggests that applied science is the province of 'normal Bartley (1984, pp.182-183) emphasised the importance of creativity, i.e. the imaginative function, as follows: '[A]n essential requirement is the fertility of the econiche: the econiche must be one in which the creation of positions and contexts, and the development of rationality, are truly inspired. Clumsily applied eradication of error may also eradicate fertility.' depicted in Figure 1 . Instead there will be a 'dogmatic filtering' function, in addition to the critical and imaginative functions, which will serve to ensure that some propositions -and in particular, some theories -are not criticised. As we can see from Figure 2 , however, it is unclear that such a filter need be 'dogmatic' in any strong sense of the word. This is because the filter may function such that no (empirical) theory is in principle immune to being passed on to the critical procedure. So if a theory is brand new, for instance, perhaps it will be shielded from criticism until it can be further developed (by the imaginative, or creative, function); hence the bidirectional arrow between the imaginative and filtering functions. But if a theory is well-developed, i.e. has had a lot of imaginative effort spent on it, perhaps it will always pass through the filter. Let us now compare this with the Kuhnian normal scientist. In contrast to her Popperian counterpart, her primary function is to solve puzzles. And in order to do this, she relies on established scientific theories and data. (We should allow that some of the data used may not itself be a product of science. However, in so far as observations are heavily theory-laden, on Kuhn's view, it is likely that said data will be given an interpretative slant -and/or that what counts as admissible data will be determined -by the disciplinary matrix.) The output of puzzle solving is both theoretical and concrete; that is to say, Kuhn does not draw a sharp distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' science in the manner that Popper does.
Fig. 3 -The Prima Facie Kuhnian Normal Scientist
We might wonder, though, whether good puzzle solving doesn't require a good degree of imagination, and therefore if the imaginative function is not also, as depicted in figure 3 , a required component of the Kuhnian scientist. Despite first appearances, a somewhat closer look at Kuhn's position appears to suggest that it is not, because exemplars provide templates for puzzle solving. As Bird (2004) puts it:
In the research tradition it inaugurates, a paradigm-as-exemplar fulfils three functions:
(i) it suggests new puzzles;
(ii) it suggests approaches to solving those puzzles;
(iii) it is the standard by which the quality of a proposed puzzle-solution can be measured.
16
To remove the 'imaginative' function from the picture is not to suggest that puzzle solving does not require considerable ingenuity, on occasion, nor to concede that it is as 'routine' as Popper (1970) suggested. The point is simply that an incredibly difficult puzzle is still little more than a puzzle when the rules of the game and procedures for playing are all fixed. And Kuhn certainly does not suggest that (normal) scientists require anything like '"an irrational element", or a "creative intuition", in Bergson's sense' (Popper 1959, p.32) . In the words of Kuhn (1963, p. 
362):
The paradigm he [the normal scientist] has acquired through prior training provides him with the rules of the game, describes the pieces with which it must be played, and indicates the nature of the required outcome. His task is to 16 See also Rowbottom Forthcoming A, Bird 2000, pp. 68-69 and Hoyningen-Huene 1993. manipulate those pieces within the rules in such a way that the required outcome is produced.
We are therefore left with the picture below, depicted in Figure 4 , in which exemplars remove the need for an imaginative function. (It is worth adding that an imaginative function may be required in extraordinary science, e.g. in order to bring exemplars in to being, but that we are not presently concerned with this.) Revolutions. So figure 5 gives a look inside the puzzle solving function, and shows that it is composed of several different processes. For a full discussion of these processes -classification and prediction, theory-experiment alignment, and articulation -see Rowbottom Forthcoming A. For present purposes, it suffices to note that these are significant functions within the function of puzzle solving.
Fig. 5 -Inside Puzzle Solving
We have now seen that despite their strikingly different views of the ideal scientist, both Popper and Kuhn had understandings that can be modelled with ease via a functional perspective. For both, to be a good scientist is simply to perform specific functions. And good science is to be understood as an activity performed by large numbers of good scientists in precisely the aforementioned sense.
However, this functional analysis makes the following questions, which we will come to in the next section, salient. Why not have different functions performed by different scientists? And why not entertain the possibility that it is (sometimes) necessary for the functions be performed by different individuals in order for science to be (or to be as close as possible to) ideal?
Functions at the Group Level: A Hybrid Model
Moving to a consideration of functions at the group level allows us to consider, first and foremost, the possibility that both dogmatism and criticism are vital components of the scientific enterprise. And while it may be suggested that Kuhn would have agreed in so far as criticism might play a crucial part in extraordinary science, his picture is one where science should go through different phases. In short, his view appears to have been that either all scientists should be doing normal science, or all scientists should be doing extraordinary science. The possibility that it might be preferable for the two kinds of activity to co-exist, in so far as some might be dogmatic and others might be critical at the same time, was never dismissed on adequate grounds. Neither Kuhn nor Popper examined this possibility in any serious depth; the former because of his belief in the importance of revolutions (derived from his historical studies), and the latter because of his long-standing belief in the importance of criticism. But how might dogmatic individuals benefit science in a way that their completely critical (and/or highly evaluative) counterparts might not? The simple answer is that they may be far more persistent in defending their pet theories (and therefore attacking competitor theories) than a more critical individual could be. So they might, for example, consider rejecting auxiliary hypotheses when their critical counterparts would not (and would instead simply reject a theory). But it is well worth reemphasising that being dogmatic in this sort of sense does not preclude being critical.
Rather, the critical activity of such an individual will have narrow scope; it will be aimed only at defending pet theories, and attacking competitor theories. So in short, to be critical in some small area is still to be critical, even though it is not necessarily to have the critical attitude that 'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth' (Popper 1945, vol. II, p.249) , or to be a pancritical rationalist in the sense of Bartley (1984) . Just as there are occasions where 'a commitment to the paradigm was needed simply to provide adequate motivation' (Kuhn 1963, p. 362) , there may be occasions where dogmatic commitment is crucial in order to push the scientist to consider avenues that would be ruled out by more evaluative individuals. My point here is that territory may be explored which would otherwise not be, and that this might result in a variety of fruits; I do not join Kuhn (1996, p.247) in thinking that such exploration will, as a general rule, be successful in isolating 'severe trouble spots'.
Furthermore, it may be a good thing for individual scientists to devote themselves to performing a small number of functions. 19 Perhaps, for instance, it is extremely difficult (due to human limitations) to be an expert puzzle solver and an expert attacker. Perhaps, indeed, the kind of person who is an expert attacker is often a lousy puzzle solver (because he or she finds it hard, qua boring, to work with externally imposed frameworks of thought or to perform repetitive tasks). So here we might say that something like van Fraassen's (2002 van Fraassen's ( , 2004a van Fraassen's ( , 2004b 20 In closing this section, we should also consider how the puzzle solving function may relate to the critical one. (Consider, again, figure 6.) First, only theories which are positively evaluated (by those performing the evaluative function) will be used for puzzle solving purposes. It is these theories that will be applied, and which will determine what sort of data is normally considered to be worthy of collection. Second, however, the puzzle solvers' data and results may be useful to those who are performing attacking and defensive critical functions. (Attempts to puzzle solve may isolate unanticipated trouble spots, for example, just as Kuhn suggested.) Third, the results of the attacking and defending processes will be evaluated, and this will determine what sort of puzzle solving takes place next. So in short, there may a fruitful interchange between puzzle solvers and criticisers; and perhaps this is the genuine lifeblood of science.
Further Questions
The model proposed above raises a quite different set of questions from those explicitly tackled by Kuhn and Popper, and A simple analogy may help. Imagine you, the chess player, are managing science. The pieces are the scientists under your command, and their capacities vary in accordance with their type (e.g. pawn or rook). The position on the board -nature is playing the opposing side -reflects the status quo. And now imagine you are told that, against the rules of normal chess, you are allowed to introduce a new pawn (which you can place 21 Note that this doesn't depend on assuming that what everyone else (other than the individual) is doing is fixed. The best thing to do might be to have the newcomer replace a particular scientist in A, so that she could be moved to B, and so on. Think of the newcomer as an added resource. 22 For an extensive discussion of this, see Rowbottom Forthcoming C.
on any unoccupied square). 23 (This is akin to the introduction of a new scientist; pieces working in combination on your side can be thought of as research groups, and so on.) Some moves will be better than others, given your aim of winning the game, and in some circumstances it will be clear that one available move is best.
So my own view is that considering social structure neither precludes employing insights from what might be called the 'logical' tradition in the philosophy of science -formal apparatus, such as confirmation or corroboration functions, for instance -nor requires acceptance of the view that studies in scientific method always require reference to the history of science. Social structure is relevant to questions of scientific method; but it is hardly as if when we discuss groups, rather than individuals, we suddenly find ourselves in territory where the 'logical' tradition has nothing to offer.
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The picture presented in this paper is complex, and the questions enumerated in this concluding section are daunting. It may prove to be the case that they are beyond our power to answer satisfactorily except in highly idealized contexts. Nevertheless, it appears that complexity is necessary if we are to truly get to grips with the question of how science should work. At the very least, the model here considered, e.g. as presented in figure 6 , provides a basic framework with which to tackle practical questions when considering the research activity of a group (or groups). And even if that model is rejected, to consider functions at the level of the group is arguably to make an important conceptual breakthrough in understanding (and therefore shaping) 23 Incidentally, there are variants of chess, such as Crazyhouse chess, where this sort of thing is possible. 24 I say this in part because one commentator on the ideas in this paper, who works in the 'logical' tradition, reacted by declaring that "Kuhn was [just] a sociologist". Not only is this wrong -as Jones (1986) shows -but also remarkably myopic.
science. If there is one message to take away, it is that ideal science may be realizable in more than one way.
